To what extent is AGOV digitally sovereign?
Initial situation
AGOV is developed and operated in collaboration with Swiss economic partners. Its operation is carried out on behalf of the Swiss Federal Chancellery in federal data centers as well as – in order to increase resilience – additionally in privately owned Swiss data centers.
The infrastructure required for the operation and use of AGOV along the entire value chain – from end users through power supply and internet infrastructure to the AGOV system itself as well as the infrastructures and specialized systems of authorities – is inherently and unavoidably embedded in international contexts. This integration affects all layers, in particular software, hardware, organizational structures, as well as the underlying know-how.
Scientific classification
The question of the extent to which AGOV is digitally sovereign cannot be answered in a single sentence. It requires a systematic and differentiated analysis based on established scientific concepts and across all components that make up AGOV.
At the conceptual level, it already becomes clear that “digital sovereignty” is not a uniformly defined term. In the scientific literature, it is interpreted differently depending on the context: as the ability for technological self-determination, as control over data and information flows, as a matter of legal embedding, or as economic independence from external actors [1][2]. This ambiguity is not a sign of conceptual vagueness, but rather reflects the multidimensional nature of digital sovereignty. A well-founded assessment therefore requires clearly specifying which dimension is being referred to.
Applying these different interpretations to AGOV shows that an isolated consideration of individual system components is insufficient. AGOV is not a monolithic system, but a complex structure composed of numerous technical and organizational elements. These include application software, libraries and frameworks, operating systems, hardware, cryptographic components, as well as the underlying network infrastructure. Each of these layers in turn depends on further components. In the technical literature, this structure is described as a deeply layered dependency architecture in which systems are built upon multiple interlocking layers [3].
This architecture, extending down to the smallest components and described in the literature as a deeply layered dependency structure – here referred to as atomicity – represents a central challenge for assessing digital sovereignty. A consistent analysis would need to include every layer down to electronic components and their supply chains: the origin of semiconductors, the integrity of firmware, dependencies in software libraries used, as well as the conditions under which they are developed and maintained. Research on the security and resilience of IT supply chains shows that these deep dependencies are key factors influencing the control and trustworthiness of digital systems [4]. Against this background, digital sovereignty does not appear as a binary state, but as a gradual and multi-layered characteristic that strongly depends on the chosen depth of analysis.
In addition, the actual value of AGOV does not lie in the isolated platform, but only becomes apparent in the interaction between end users and authorities. The benefit arises from this relationship and is therefore part of a broader digital value chain. In systems theory, and particularly in research on sociotechnical systems, it is emphasized that digital systems must always be understood as the interplay of technical components, human actors, and organizational frameworks [5]. An assessment of digital sovereignty must therefore take this entire chain into account.
On the side of end users, this includes the devices used, the operating systems and applications running on them, as well as their security configurations. Structural dependencies also exist here, for example on globally operating platform providers, manufacturers, and software ecosystems. Digital sovereignty is therefore not solely a property of state systems, but also a question of the technological and organizational embedding of users themselves.
Between end users and authorities lies the connectivity and transport layer. Telecommunications networks, internet service providers, routing infrastructures, and international data paths are fundamental prerequisites for any use of AGOV. Research on internet governance and digital infrastructure shows that these layers are also characterized by complex, often cross-border dependencies [6]. Their control, resilience, and trustworthiness are therefore integral components of any assessment of digital sovereignty.
On the side of authorities, specialized applications, registers, backend systems, as well as operational and hosting infrastructures come into focus. Here too, dependencies exist with regard to technologies used, operating models, and organizational structures, all of which must be included in the overall assessment.
The described atomicity extends along the entire value chain. End devices contain components from global supply chains, network infrastructures rely on internationally developed hardware and software, and even fundamental prerequisites such as energy supply are part of the overall system. Ultimately, this leads to questions that go beyond the narrow IT context: the role of physical infrastructures, the importance of energy supply, and the embedding of digital systems in global industrial contexts.
Against this background, it becomes clear that digital sovereignty cannot be understood as an absolute property. It is relative, depending on the underlying definitions and the chosen level of analysis. It is distributed across numerous technical and organizational components and embedded in a complex web of dependencies that extends far beyond a single system.
For AGOV, this means that the question of digital sovereignty can only be answered in the context of the overall system. What is decisive is not the platform alone, but the interaction of all involved elements – from end users through network infrastructure to the systems of authorities. Digital sovereignty is therefore not a static property, but an ongoing design task encompassing all layers of this system.
References
[1] Florian Pohle; Thorsten Thiel (2020): Digital Sovereignty.
[2] Stéphane Couture; Sophie Toupin (2019): What does the notion of sovereignty mean when referring to the digital?
[3] Andrew S. Tanenbaum; Herbert Bos (2015): Modern Operating Systems.
[4] Nir Kshetri (2018): The Economics of Cybersecurity: A Supply Chain Perspective.
[5] Eric Trist; Ken Bamforth (1951): Some Social and Psychological Consequences of the Longwall Method.
[6] Laura DeNardis (2014): The Global War for Internet Governance.